Skip to main content

Full text of "Gilley"

See other formats

THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY, 2017! 0.1 080/01 436597.201 7.1 369037 

0 Check for updates 

TWO ’Q Rout|ed g e 

M. WlTF Taylor & Francis Croup 

The case for colonialism 

Bruce Gilley 

Department of Political Science, Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA 


For the last 1 00 years. Western colonialism has had a bad name. It is 
high time to question this orthodoxy. Western colonialism was, as a 
general rule, both objectively beneficial and subjectively legitimate in 
most of the places where it was found, using realistic measures of those 
concepts. The countries that embraced their colonial inheritance, by 
and large, did better than those that spurned it. Anti-colonial ideology 
imposed grave harms on subject peoples and continues to thwart 
sustained development and a fruitful encounter with modernity in 
many places. Colonialism can be recovered by weak and fragile states 
today in three ways: by reclaiming colonial modes of governance; 
by recolonising some areas; and by creating new Western colonies 
from scratch. 


Received 24 April 201 7 
Accepted 1 5 August 201 7 


Decolonisation and 
humanitarian interventions 
fragile states 


For the last 1 00 years, Western colonialism has had a bad name. Colonialism has virtually 
disappeared from international affairs, and there is no easier way to discredit a political idea 
or opponent than to raise the cry of 'colonialism'. When South African opposition politician 
Helen Zille tweeted in 201 7 that Singapore's success was in part attributable to its ability to 
'build on valuable aspects of colonial heritage', she was vilified by the press, disciplined by 
her party, and put under investigation by the country's human rights commission. 

It is high time to reevaluate this pejorative meaning.The notion that colonialism is always 
and everywhere a bad thing needs to be rethought in light of the grave human toll of a 
century of anti-colonial regimes and policies. The case for Western colonialism is about 
rethinking the past as well as improving the future. It involves reaffirming the primacy of 
human lives, universal values, and shared responsibilities - the civilising mission without 
scare quotes - that led to improvements in living conditions for most Third World peoples 
during most episodes of Western colonialism. It also involves learning how to unlock those 
benefits again. Western and non-Western countries should reclaim the colonial toolkit and 
language as part of their commitment to effective governance and international order. 

There are three ways to reclaim colonialism. One is for governments and peoples in devel- 
oping countries to replicate as far as possible the colonial governance of their pasts - as 
successful countries like Singapore, Belize and Botswana did.The'good governance'agenda, 
which contains too many assumptions about the self-governing capacity of poor countries, 

CONTACT Bruce Gilley @ 
© 201 7 Southseries Inc., 

2 @ B. GILLEY 

should be replaced with the 'colonial governance' agenda. A second way is to recolonise 
some areas. Western countries should be encouraged to hold power in specific governance 
areas (public finances, say, or criminal justice) in order to jump-start enduring reforms in 
weak states. Rather than speak in euphemisms about'shared sovereignty'or'neo-trusteeship', 
such actions should be called 'colonialism' because it would embrace rather than evade the 
historical record. Thirdly, in some instances it may be possible to build new Western colonies 
from scratch. 

Colonialism can return (either as a governance style or as an extension ofWestern author- 
ity) only with the consent of the colonised. Yet now that the nationalist generation that 
forced sudden decolonisation on hapless populations has passed away, the time may be 
ripe. Sebe has documented how the founding figures ofWestern colonialism in Africa (such 
as Livingstone in Zambia, Lugard in Nigeria and de Brazza in Congo) are enjoying a resur- 
gence of official and social respect in those countries now that romanticised pre-colonial 
and disappointing postcolonial approaches to governance have lost their sheen. 1 As one 
young man on the streets of Kinshasa asked Van Reybrouck (as described in his seminal 201 0 
book on the Congo): 'How long is this independence of ours going to last anyway? When 
are the Belgians coming back?' 2 

Three failures of anti-colonial critique 

The case for the past record ofWestern colonialism - usually referring to British, French, 
German, Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese colonies from the early nineteenth to mid-twentieth 
centuries - rests on overturning two distinct lines of criticism: that it was objectively harmful 
(rather than beneficial); and that it was subjectively illegitimate (rather than legitimate). 
There is, in addition, a third line of criticism that merits revision: that it offends the sensibilities 
of contemporary society. 

The objective costs/benefits approach identifies a certain need of human flourishing - 
development, security, governance, rights, etc. - and asks whether colonialism improved or 
worsened the objective provision of that need. One main challenge of this research is to 
properly enumerate the things that matter and then to assign them weights, weights that 
presumably varied with time and place. In a brutally patriarchal society, for instance, access 
to justice for women may have been more important than the protection of indigenous land 
rights (which may be part of that patriarchy), as Andreski argued was the case for women 
in northern Nigeria under colonialism. 3 

A second challenge is measuring the counterfactual: what would likely have happened 
in a given place absent colonial rule? Many research designs, for instance, control for varia- 
tions in colonial rule itself and for a variety of other factors that co-existed with colonialism 
(such as cultural norms, geography, population, disease burden, etc.) But they do not control 
for the presence or absence of colonialism, for instance a highly cited study by Acemoglu 
and colleagues. 4 To construct such a counterfactual requires measuring not just global social, 
economic and technological trends but also the likely course of indigenous development, 
of regional factors and of an ungoverned non-colonial encounter with the West. Countries 
that did not have a significant colonial history - China, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand, Haiti and Guatemala, for instance -provide a measure of comparison to help iden- 
tify what if anything were the distinctive effects of colonialism. So too does research into 
pre-colonial histories that, almost by definition, reveal comparatively weak institutions, 


divided societies and subsistence economies, for instance in Biber's study of pre-colonial 
Namibia. 5 

Noting some of these complexities, Abernethy summarises the objective costs/benefits 
question as follows: 

[l]n times and places where colonial rule had, on balance, a positive effect on training for self-gov- 
ernment, material well-being, labor allocation choices, individual upward mobility, cross-cultural 
communication, and human dignity, compared to the situation that would likely have obtained 
absent European rule, then the case for colonialism is strong. Conversely, in times and places 
where the effects of foreign rule in these respects were, on balance, negative compared to a 
territory's likely alternative past, then colonialism is morally indefensible . 6 

Beyond these requirements, there is a list of simple epistemic virtues. Non-biased data and 
case selection, for instance, requires that evidence be gathered in a way that does not confirm 
the hypothesis at stake. So any claim about, say, the level of colonial violence requires not 
just assumptions about the scale of violence that would have occurred absent colonial rule 
but also a careful measure of that violence relative to the population, security threat and 
security resources in a given territory. One is hard-pressed, to take a prominent example, to 
find a single example of such care in measurement in the vast critical scholarship on the 
British counter-insurgency campaign against the Mau in Kenya from 1 952 to 1 960, especially 
the scolding work of Elkins. 7 Daniels argues that'[h]ad the British left Kenya to the Mau, there 
would have been anarchy and further civil war, perhaps even genocide'. 8 Just as many 
Kenyans joined the Kikuyu Home Guard and the special prison service forthe rebels as joined 
the insurgency, and the independent Kenyan government long applauded the historic con- 
tribution of the British in suppressing the movement. 9 At the very least, it is incumbent on 
scholars to show that the brutalities unleashed by the British in this campaign were not the 
likely result of a proportionate response given the context and scale of the threat. If this 
supposedly solid case is wobbly, what does it tell us about the lesser 'violence' often cited 
as invalidating colonialism? 

Perhaps the most egregious violation of epistemic virtues is internal coherence (or 
non-contradiction). Eminent scholars repeatedly make the logically contradictory claim that 
colonialism was both too disruptive and not disruptive enough, whether with regard to 
boundaries, governing institutions, economic systems or social structures, as evidenced in 
the short space of just two pages by Young. 10 Africanists in particular applaud the work both 
of Herbst, 11 who argued that colonialism did too little state-making, and Young, 12 who earlier 
argued that it did too much. New territorial boundaries are criticised for forcing social inte- 
gration while old ones are criticised for reinforcing tribalism, a contradiction noted by 
Lefebvre. 13 Marxist scholars found colonialism at fault when it did not invest in public health 
and infrastructure (showing a callous disregard for labour) and when it did (in order to exploit 
it). 14 Colonialism is credited with near-magical powers to sweep away everything good in 
its path (like tribal chiefs or ethnic identity) and with equally magical powers to make per- 
manent everything bad in its path (like tribal chiefs or ethnic identity). 

Finally, there is the simple epistemic virtue of falsification. This is most pointed in the 
treatment of what was undoubtedly a benefit of colonialism: the abolition of slave-trading. 
Anti-colonial critics squirm and fidget over this issue because it puts the greatest strain on 
their 'colonialism bad' perspective. The result is a constant stream of revisionism: it did not 
happen fast enough; there were mixed motives; not all colonial officials supported it; former 
slaves remained poor and former slave owners remained rich; it should never have existed 
in the first place. 15 

4 @ B. GILLEY 

Of course, not all research falls afoul of the basic prescriptions above. Research that is 
careful in conceptualising and measuring controls, that establishes a feasible counterfactual, 
that includes multiple dimensions of costs and benefits weighted in some justified way, and 
that adheres to basic epistemic virtues often finds that at least some if not many or most 
episodes of Western colonialism were a net benefit, as the literature review by Juan and 
Pierskalla shows. 16 Such works have found evidence for significant social, economic and 
political gains under colonialism: expanded education, improved public health, the abolition 
of slavery, widened employment opportunities, improved administration, the creation of 
basic infrastructure, female rights, enfranchisement of untouchable or historically excluded 
communities, fair taxation, access to capital, the generation of historical and cultural knowl- 
edge, and national identify formation, to mention just a few dimensions. 17 

This leads to the second failure of anti-colonial critique. Given that objective costs and 
benefits varied with time and place, another approach is simply to defer to the judgements 
of those affected. The subjective legitimacy approach asks whether the people subject to 
colonialism treated it, through their beliefs and actions, as rightful. As Hechter showed, alien 
rule has often been legitimate in world history because it has provided better governance 
than the indigenous alternative. 18 

Anti-colonial critics simply assert that colonialism was, in Hopkins's words, 'a foreign impo- 
sition lacking popular legitimacy'. 19 Yet until very late, European colonialism appears to have 
been highly legitimate and for good reasons. Millions of people moved closer to areas of 
more intensive colonial rule, sent their children to colonial schools and hospitals, went 
beyond the call of duty in positions in colonial governments, reported crimes to colonial 
police, migrated from non-colonised to colonised areas, fought for colonial armies and par- 
ticipated in colonial political processes - all relatively voluntary acts. Indeed, the rapid spread 
and persistence of Western colonialism with very little force relative to the populations and 
areas concerned is prima facie evidence of its acceptance by subject populations compared 
to the feasible alternatives. The 'preservers', 'facilitators'and 'collaborators' of colonialism, as 
Abernethy shows, far outnumbered the'resisters'at least until very late:'lmperial expansion 
was frequently the result not just of European push but also of indigenous pull'. 20 In Borneo, 
the Sultan of Brunei installed an English traveller, James Brooke, as the rajah of his chaotic 
province of Sarawak in 1 841 , after which order and prosperity expanded to such an extent 
that even once a British protectorate was established in 1 888, the Sultan preferred to leave 
it under Brooke family control until 1 946. 21 

Sir Alan Burns, the governor of the Gold Coast during World War II, noted that 

had the people of the Gold Coast wished to push us into the sea there was little to prevent 
them. But this was the time when the people came forward in their thousands, not with empty 
protestations of loyalty but with men to serve in the army ... and with liberal gifts to war funds 
and war charities. This was curious conduct for people tired of British rule . 22 

In most colonial areas, subject peoples either faced grave security threats from rival groups 
or they saw the benefits of being governed by a modernised and liberal state. Patrice 
Lumumba, who became an anti-colonial agitator only very late, praised Belgian colonial rule 
in his autobiography of 1 962 for'restoring our human dignity and turning us into free, happy, 
vigorous, and civilized men’. 23 Chinua Achebe's many pro-colonial statements, meanwhile, 
have been virtually airbrushed from memory by anti-colonial ideology. 24 The few scholars 
who take note of such evidence typically dismiss it as a form of false consciousness. 25 



The failure of anti-colonial critique to come to terms with the objective benefits and 
subjective legitimacy of colonialism points to a third and deeper failure: it was never intended 
to be 'true' in the sense of being a scientific claim justified through shared standards of inquiry 
that was liable to falsification. The origins of anti-colonial thought were political and ideo- 
logical. The purpose was not historical accuracy but contemporaneous advocacy. Today, 
activists associate 'decolonisation' (or 'postcolonialism') with all manner of radical social 
transformation, which unintentionally ties historic conclusions to present-day endeavours. 
Unmoored from historical fact, postcolonialism became what Williams 26 called a metropol- 
itan flaneur culture of attitude and performance whose recent achievements include an 
inquiry into the glories of sado-masochism among Third World women 27 and a burgeoning 
literature on the horrors of colonialism under countries that never had colonies. 28 

This third failure of anti-colonial critique is perhaps most damaging. It is not just an obsta- 
cle to historical truth, which itself is a grave disservice. Even as a means of contemporary 
advocacy, it is self-wounding. For it essentially weaponises the colonial past, as the gradually 
imploding postcolonial South African state's persecution of Helen Zille shows. 'What a 
meta-narrative of anti-colonial sentiment can render invisible are ways in which people 
made claims on new possibilities without deploying either anti- or pro-colonial idioms', 
Englund writes in his study of colonial-era newspapers in Zambia. 

To devote all scholarly attention to the question of how different actors during this period 
sought to end colonial rule is to succumb to a limiting meta-narrative of anti-colonialism, one 
that allows no conceptual space between colonial and anti-colonial agendas, and thereby keeps 
other possibilities inaccessible to the scholarly and moral imagination . 29 

The costs of anti-colonialism 

It is hard to overstate the pernicious effects of global anti-colonialism on domestic and 
international affairs since the end of World War II. Anti-colonialism ravaged countries as 
nationalist elites mobilised illiterate populations with appeals to destroy the market econ- 
omies, pluralistic and constitutional polities, and rational policy processes of European col- 
onisers. In our 'age of apology' 30 for atrocities, one of the many conspicuous silences has 
been an apology for the many atrocities visited upon Third World peoples by anti-colonial 

Few cases better illustrate this than Guinea-Bissau and its anti-colonial 'hero' Amilcar 
Cabral. In launching a guerrilla war against Portuguese rule in 1963 Cabral insisted that it 
was 'necessary to totally destroy, to break, to reduce to ash all aspects of the colonial state 
in our country in order to make everything possible for our people'. 31 He took aim at a suc- 
cessful colonial state that had quadrupled rice production 32 and initiated sustained gains in 
life expectancy 33 since bringing the territory under control in 1 936. Cabral, in his own words, 
was 'never able to mobilize the people on the basis of the struggle against colonialism'. 34 
Instead, he secured training and arms from Cuba, Russia and Czechoslovakia and economic 
assistance from Sweden. 35 The resulting war killed 1 5,000 combatants (out of a population 
of 600,000) and at least as many civilians, and displaced another 1 50,000 (a quarter of the 

Once'liberation'was achieved in 1 974, a second human tragedy unfolded, costing at least 
1 0,000 further lives as a direct result of conflict. By 1 980, rice production had fallen by more 
than 50% to 80,000 tonnes (from a peak of 1 82,000 tonnes under the Portuguese). Politics 

6 @ B. GILLEY 

became a 'cantankerous din of former revolutionaries' in the words of Forrest. 36 Cabral's half- 
brother, who became president, unleashed the secret police on the tiny opposition - 500 
bodies were found in three mass graves for dissidents in 1 981 , 37 A tenth of the remaining 
population upped stakes for Senegal. 38 The Cabralian one-party state expanded to 1 5,000 
employees, 1 0 times as big as the Portuguese administration at its peak. 39 Confused Marxist 
scholars blamed the legacies of colonialism or the weather or Israel. 40 

Things have gotten worse. Guinea-Bissau has a more or less permanent United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping force and continues to suck up millions in aid as the 'continuadores de 
Cabral' squabble under what the World Bank calls 'continuing political disarray'. 41 Today, in 
per-capita terms, rice production is still only one-third of what it was under the Portuguese 
despite 40 years of international aid and technological advances.The health transition, mean- 
while, slowed considerably after independence. By 2015, the average Guinea-Bissauan was 
living to just 55, meaning gains of just 0.3 years of extra life per year since independence, 
less than half ofthe 0.73 extra years of life per year being gained in the late colonial period. 
What might have become a prosperous and humane Macau or Goa of Africa is today a 
cesspool of human suffering. Western and African anti-colonial scholars continue to extol 
Cabral's 'national liberation' ideas. 42 But actually existing Guineans may be asking: When are 
the Portuguese coming back? 

Guinea-Bissau seems like an extreme case. It is not. Ofthe 80 countries that threw off the 
colonial 'yoke' after World War II, at least half experienced similar trauma, while most of the 
rest limped on. For 60 years, Third World despots have raised the spectre of recolonisation 
to discredit democratic oppositions and ruin their economies. Yet there is virtually nothing 
written about most of these postcolonial traumas since, as Igreja notes, it still assumed that 
anti-colonial movements were victims rather than victimisers. 43 Scholars in full Eurocentric 
mode prefer to churn out books on colonial atrocities or to suggest that 'colonial legacies' 
have something to do with the follies and body blows inflicted on these countries by their 
anti-colonial leaders. 44 

To be sure, just as the colonial era was not an unalloyed good, the independence era has 
not been an unalloyed bad. A few postcolonial states are in reasonable health. Those whose 
moral imaginations were not shrouded by anti-colonial ideology had the most productive 
encounter with modernity, emerging as leaders of what W. Arthur Lewis called the 'creative' 
Third World. 45 

But most ofthe rest remained stuck in anti-colonial 'protest' identities with dire conse- 
quences for human welfare. A sobering World Bank report of 1996 noted: 'Almost every 
African country has witnessed a systematic regression of capacity in the last 30 years; the 
majority had better capacity at independence than they now possess'. 46 This loss of state 
capacity was no trifle; it meant the loss of tens of millions of lives. And it is not getting better. 
For instance, only 13 of 102 historically developing countries are on track to have high state 
capacity by the year 21 00, according to Andrews and colleagues. The people of Bangladesh 
will have to wait another 244 years at their current rate to reach a high-capacity state. 47 
Would it have taken Britain, even in some adjusted role (as discussed below), until the middle 
of the twenty-third century to institute good government in this former province of Eastern 

In international affairs, meanwhile, otherwise liberal and democratic states such as India, 
Brazil and South Africa continue to style themselves as enemies of Western colonialism. As 
Chatterjee Miller shows, the foreign policies of these former colonies continue to be driven 



by a sense ofvictimhood and entitlement rather than rational self-interest or global respon- 
sibility. 48 This means that every time the world is desperate for a coordinated response to a 
human, political or security catastrophe - in Sri Lanka, Venezuela or Zimbabwe, for instance 
- the voices of anti-colonialism intercede to prevent action. As it turned out, the most serious 
threat to human rights and world peace was not colonialism - as the United Nations declared 
in 1 960 - but anti-colonialism. 

Chatterjee Miller argues that it is the responsibility of the West to be 'sensitive' to these 
anti-colonial viewpoints. An alternative view is that it is the responsibility of the West to help 
these nations kick the habit. After all, Britain's rise is surely inseparable from the ways that it 
embraced and celebrated its colonisers from the Romans through to the Normans. If anti-co- 
lonial sentiments had gone unchallenged in Britain, the country today would be a backwater 
of druid worshippers. 

Resurrecting colonial governance 

Even as intellectuals have continued to plough the anti-colonial furrow since the end of the 
Cold War, many countries have changed their domestic governance to replant the seeds of 
'colonial governance'. This agenda has many things in common with the'good governance' 
agenda: economic liberalisation, political pluralism and administrative streamlining have 
replaced the socialist road in most countries. But the colonial governance agenda is distinct 
from the good governance agenda in two respects. 

First, the colonial governance agenda explicitly affirms and borrows from a country's 
colonial past, searching for ideas and notions of governmentality. As Burton and Jennings 
note, 'In the first decade or so after independence . . . East African governments often adopted 
or adapted both administrative structures and ideological concepts from their colonial pre- 
decessors in order to create quite successful forms of governance - certainly by regional 
standards'. 49 In many cases, colonial bureaucrats and police were rehired by the newly inde- 
pendent governments. 

Reclaiming this colonial trajectory abandoned at independence is key to the colonial 
governance agenda. No less an anti-colonial 'hero'than Chinua Achebe ended his days with 
a memoir that explicitly affirmed the positive contributions of colonialism to governance in 
his native Nigeria: '[l]t is important to face the fact that British colonies were, more or less, 
expertly run', he wrote. 50 What was important about Achebe's'articulation ofthe unsayable', 
as Msiska called it, was his rediscovery of 'the colonial national formation as a habitable 
community'. 51 This had concrete implications for how to organise the civil service, how to 
manage federalism and how to promote education. As with democratic episodes in a coun- 
try's past, colonial episodes become an attic to ransack in search of a livable past. This also 
underscores the importance of reinvesting in a non-biased historiography of colonialism so 
that the colonial periods are seen not as objects of resistance but as fruitful sources of 

Secondly, and related, the colonial governance agenda recognises that the capacity for 
effective self-government is lacking and cannot be conjured out of thin air. The lack of state 
capacity to uphold the rule of law and deliver public services was the central tragedy of 
'independence' in the Third World, as a few voices like Plamenatz and Barnes warned at the 
time. 52 To reclaim 'colonial governance'means increasing foreign involvement in key sectors 
in business, civil society and the public sector in order to this bolster this capacity. In 1 985, 

8 @ B. GILLEY 

for instance, the Indonesian government fired all 6000 government inspectors at the Jakarta 
port ofTanjung Priok and replaced the corrupt and inefficient customs service with the Swiss 
firm SGS.The Swiss rebuilt the customs service, handing back partial control in 1991 and full 
control in 1997. 53 Indonesia's exports boomed. Civil society and successful policy reforms, 
meanwhile, improve faster with the presence of international civil society actors, as they did 
in the colonial era, as shown by studies of environmental civil society. 54 Multinational cor- 
porations, moreover, can be tasked with public service provision neartheirfacilities in direct 
imitation of colonial practices, as Honke has documented. 55 

The colonial governance agenda embraces a cosmopolitanism - a civilising mission - 
often lacking in the good governance agenda. Bain, for instance, admits the 'grim reality' 
and 'ghastly consequences' of decolonisation. 56 Yet he simultaneously rejects the idea that 
the West has anything to offer, since this implies an imperial mission. This'uncritical critique 
of the liberal peace', as Chandler 57 calls it, consigns Third World nations to the foibles and 
vagaries of 'authentic' or 'indigenous' practices, a de facto abandonment of hope in their 
self-governing capacities. By contrast, the colonial governance agenda resurrects the uni- 
versalism of the liberal peace and with it a shared standard of what a well-governed country 
looks like. 

The case for recolonisation 

The second broad way to reclaim colonialism is to recolonise some areas. It may be that in 
some cases, only a formal share of sovereignty for Western countries can provide the mix of 
accountability and authority needed to build capacity in weak states. In Chesterman's oft- 
quoted phrase, the problem with modern statebuilding is not that it'is colonial in character; 
rather the problem is that sometimes it is not colonial enough'. 58 

The World Bank and United States, for instance, experimented with 'co-signatory' arrange- 
ments in Liberia and Chad in the 1 990s and 2000s, where major government expenditures 
required the signatures of both domestic and external agents. In the Australia-led Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) or the UN's International Commission against 
Impunity in Guatemala (known by its Spanish acronym CICIG), key legal and police functions 
were handed over to external powers because of rampant corruption and criminalisation 
of the state. 

Sebe calls this 'cosmopolitan nation-building' because it represents an explicit rejection 
of the parochial myth of self-governing capacity that drove most postcolonial countries into 
the ground. 59 Rather than use an ever-expanding set of euphemisms that avoid the 'C' word 
- 'shared sovereignty', 'conservatorship', 'proxy governance', 'transitional administration', 
'neo-trusteeship', 'cooperative intervention'- these arrangements should be called 'coloni- 
alism' because it would embrace rather than evade the historical record. As Ignatieff wrote 
in 2002: 'Imperialism doesn't stop being necessary just because it becomes politically 
incorrect'. 60 

While the conceptual abandonment of the myth of self-governing capacity is now main- 
stream, the challenges of making new forms of colonialism work are immense. There are 
three separate questions for policymakers: (1) how to make colonialism acceptable to the 
colonised; (2) how to motivate Western countries to become colonial again; and (3) how to 
make colonialism achieve lasting results. 


Any colonial relationship requires a high degree of acceptance from the local population. 
Perhaps this explains why post-Cold War interventions have sought to emphasise their par- 
ticipatory and consensual nature in contrast with an alleged illegitimate and coercively 
imposed colonialism. 61 This is another area where an accurate historiography of colonialism 
is sorely needed because, as noted, colonialism usually spread with a significant degree of 
consent from politically salient actors. 

One lesson from colonial legitimation is that at least in the initial phases, legitimacy will 
be demonstrated not by the holding of a plebiscite or by the support of organised and 
broadly representative groups but simply by the ability of the intervening state to win com- 
pliance from key actors and get the job done.Too often, critics of modern interventions have 
decried the lack of 'accountability or representation'. 62 Yet it is precisely the absence of con- 
ditions for meaningful accountability or representation that makes intervention necessary 
in the first place, much as colonialism spread in orderto better manage ungoverned encoun- 
ters with the West. As Chesterman wrote: 'If genuine local control were possible, then a 
transitional administration would not be necessary'. The creation of accountable political 
power 'may well be the end of the transitional administration', he writes, 'but by definition 
it is not the means'. 63 

To push the logic further, it is the intervening state, bound to act as a trustee, that has the 
capacity initially to choose a legitimate path forward. As in colonial times, foreign control 
by a liberal state with its own robust accountability mechanisms is the closest that a people 
with a weak state can come to 'local ownership'. The widespread support in Sierra Leone for 
the 1 999 to 2005 British overhaul and rebuilding of the police force was explained by this 
externally created legitimacy with an explicit colonial vestige: 'There has always been a soft 
spot for the British among Sierra Leoneans. That feeling has now come into full play, with 
public demands for the Brits to stay for as long as necessary, because of the helpless condition 
of the country', one local journalist noted. 64 

The legitimacy of a new colonialism will almost always require a local leader who is both 
domestically popular and a strong advocate of the colonial relationship. After initial scepti- 
cism, Liberia's energetic president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf championed the post-2005 
Government and Economic Assistance Management Program (GEMAP) that gave extensive 
powers over spending and budgeting to external actors. As a result, Liberians generally 
welcomed GEMAP. 65 'Although some Liberian politicians see the plan as thinly veiled colo- 
nialism, it is wildly popular among those living on the rubbish-strewn streets of the capital', 
noted The Times. "'We love GEMAP," Henry Williams, a shopkeeper, said to nods from the 
crowd at the counter. "It will stop the politicians from stealing from us'". 66 

The dynamics of colonial legitimation moving forward are tricky because as a country 
'earns sovereignty'the legitimacy of the colonial relationship will decline if it is not constantly 
recalibrated and reaffirmed. As local institutions and norms improve, the colonial relationship 
will become more intensive but also more contested because of this more complex polity. 
Again, lessons from past colonialism are germane: 'The central paradox of the process of 
colonial exit was that it coincided in most cases with the most active phase of colonial 
state-building', wrote Darwin. 67 

Very little attention is ever paid to the second challenge although it is arguably greater: 
how to motivate Western countries to become colonial. Despite cries of 'exploitation', colo- 
nialism was probably a money loser for imperial powers. The Stanford economist Richard 
Hammond coined the term 'uneconomic imperialism' to describe the ways that European 

10 @ B. GILLEY 

powers embarked on ruinously costly and ultimately money-losing colonialism for largely 
non-economic reasons. 68 That is why they gave up their colonies so easily, as Wu also showed 
with regard to the Dutch surrender ofTaiwan. 69 The benefits of empire were widely diffused 
while the costs were narrowly borne by the colonial power. As Kaplan wrote: The real prob- 
lem with imperialism is not that it is evil, but rather that it is too expensive and therefore a 
problematic grand strategy for a country like the United States'. 70 

Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy, for instance, calculated that the RAMSI 
programme cost Australian taxpayers about US$2 billion over its 10-year period, roughly 
the annual health and education budget for the capital city of Canberra, or the equivalent 
of a year's economic output for every Solomon Islander. The institute described this as 'a 
massive investment for a country where Australia's interests are limited'. 71 The moment there 
was a whiff of Solomon Islander opposition using anti-colonial tropes, the Australians headed 
home. 72 A willingness to assume responsibility for the affairs of a foreign land will not come 
easily since Western governments are held closely to account for their spending and anti-co- 
lonial ideology can be easily mobilised. The UN, meanwhile, is not likely to step in with more 
'international administration' due to the enduring anti-colonialism of leading Third World 
states. 73 Collier's suggestion for expanded UN-led governance provision is impractical for 
this reason. 74 

To solve the incentives problem, Hechter has called for a'market in transnational govern- 
ance' 75 which we might call less euphemistically 'colonialism for hire'. Colonial states would 
be paid for their services, an important motivator to be successful. The contractual motivation 
would also strengthen consent through periodic renegotiation of the terms. If properly 
designed, host countries would more than recoup those costs through higher foreign invest- 
ment, lower external borrowing costs and greater business confidence, benefits that were 
arguably more significant than improved governance in the colonial era. 76 

That still leaves the third question of whether new forms of colonialism would work. The 
salient point is simply to draw attention to the relevance of the colonial past to this question 
since the appropriate models for statebuilding are probably not modern liberal ones but 
something else. 77 Whereas the number of post-Cold War interventions involving a share of 
sovereignty has been quite small, there were many episodes and types of colonialism from 
which to draw lessons. For instance, the largely successful resurrection of the state in 
Cambodia after a Chinese-imposed genocidal regime isnof attributable to the UN-led recon- 
struction effort of 1 992-1 993. Liberal peacebuilding failed in Cambodia judged in terms of 
the intention to create a robust democracy or an independent police and army. 78 Rather, 
what emerged was a successful semi-authoritarian polity with deep roots in the colonial 
past. 79 

One lesson from the colonial past is that the share of sovereignty needs to be substantial 
and thorough in most cases. If external actors are constrained to work with rotten local 
institutions, as Matanock has argued, 80 "then reforms will be difficult. Remaking a local police 
force may be possible without a share of sovereignty, but cleaning out a thoroughly corrupt 
national criminal justice system requires external control. Again, the reason to reclaim the 
word 'colonialism' is that it does not sidestep this important empirical insight. 

The second lesson is what Lemay-Hebert calls 'the centrality of the social', - that is, the 
centrality of a congruence between the values in the community and those of the state. 81 
Liberal interventions fail, he argued, because of their aversion to the social. Colonial inter- 
ventions, by contrast, may stand a greater chance of success because historically this 



'emphasis on the social' is what colonialism was good at: the dual mandate, indirect rule, 
minimal expatriate staffs and customary law went hand in hand with the infrastructure of 
modernity (schools, universal laws, 'Western' medicine, etc.) 'Since gaining independence, 
Congo has never has at its disposal an army comparable in efficiency and discipline to the 
former [Belgian colonial] Force Publique', was Van Reybrouck's sad conclusion. 82 Maybe the 
Belgians should come back. 

The tale of Galinhas 

Even with local legitimacy, Western will and a good plan, the challenges of making new 
forms of colonialism work are immense. Leaders will need to come up with novel solutions 
to continued chaos and displacement caused by a century of anti-colonial policies. So here 
is a modest idea: build new Western colonies from scratch. 

In 2009, the economist Paul Romer - who became the World Bank's chief economist in 
2016- suggested that rich nations build 'charter cities' in poor countries. 83 Under this model, 
largely empty land is leased to a foreign nation or group of nations so that their sovereignty 
allows a modern enclave to grow up, as was the case in Hong Kong. That tiny British colony, 
according to Romer, 'did more to reduce world poverty than all the aid programs that we've 
undertaken in the last century'. 

New colonies solve the three challenges above nicely. For the local population, they are 
legitimate because citizens choose to move there, escaping worse situations, and because 
their governments agree to the terms. They are potentially attractive to Western states 
because for conservatives they are low risk and self-financing while for liberals they are 'acts 
of justice'. 84 Finally, charter cities could be effective - which was Romer's main concern in 
developing the idea - because they have a blank slate to transplant home institutions with- 
out having to work with rotten local ones. 

Back to Guinea-Bissau. Suppose that the government of Guinea-Bissau were to lease back 
to Portugal the small uninhabited island of Galinhas that lies 1 0 miles off the mainland and 
where the former colonial governor's mansion lies in ruins. The annual lease would be US$ 1 so 
that the Portuguese spend their money on the island and the Guinea-Bissau government is 
not dependent on a lease fee. Suppose, then, that the US$1 0 million to US$20 million in foreign 
aid wasted annually on the country were redirected to this new offshore colony to create basic 
infrastructure. As part of the deal, the Portuguese would allow a certain number of Guinea- 
Bissau residents to resettle on the island each year. Portuguese institutions and sovereignty 
would be absolute here for the term of the lease - say 99 years, as was the case with the main- 
land parts of Hong Kong. A small European state would grow up on the African coast. 

At 60 square miles, Galinhas could, over time, easily accommodate the entire population 
of Guinea-Bissau. If successful, it would attract talent, trade and capital. The mainland parts 
of Guinea-Bissau would benefit from living next to an economic dynamo and learning to 
emulate its success, while symbolically escaping from the half-century anti-colonial night- 
mare of Amilcar Cabral. The same idea could be tried all over the coastlines of Africa and the 
Middle East if successful. Colonialism could be resurrected without the usual cries of oppres- 
sion, occupation, and exploitation. 

A preposterous idea? Perhaps. But not so preposterous as the anti-colonial ideology that 
for the past 1 00 years has been haunting the lives of hundreds of millions of people in theThird 
World. A hundred years of disaster is enough. It is time to make the case for colonialism again. 

12 @ B. GILLEY 

Disclosure statement 

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. 

Note on Contributor 

Bruce Gilley is a professor of political science at Portland State University. His research centres 
on comparative and international politics, with specific interests in political legitimacy and 
statebuilding, democracy and democratic transitions, climate change policy, and the Third 
World. He is a specialist on the politics of Asia and China. He is currently working on a biog- 
raphy of Sir Alan Burns, a former British colonial governor and representative to the United 
Nations Trusteeship Council. Dr Gilley holds a PhD in politics from Princeton University and 
an MPhil in economics from the University of Oxford. 


1. Sebe, "Post-Colonialism to Cosmopolitan Nation-Building?" 

2. Van Reybrouck, Congo, 255. 

3. Andreski, Old Wives' Tales. 

4. Acemoglu et al., "Colonial Origins of Comparative Development." 

5. Biber, Intertribal War in Pre-Colonial Namibia. 

6. Abernethy, Dynamics of Global Dominance, 403. 

7. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning. 

8. Daniels, "Mau Mau Revisited," 26. 

9. Stanley, "History Is Never Black and White"; and Branch, "Enemy Within." 

10. Young, "Heritage of Colonialism," 11, 13. 

1 1 . Herbst, States and Power in Africa. 

1 2. Young, African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. 

13. Lefebvre,"We Have Tailored Africa." 

1 4. E. Bums, British Imperialism in West Africa. 

15 Miers and Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule in Africa; Misevich and Mann, Rise and Demise of 
Slavery; and Ribi Forclaz, Humanitarian Imperialism. 

16. Juan and Pierskalla, "Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies." 

1 7. Lange, Mahoney, and vom Hau, "Colonialism and Development"; Fieldhouse, The Westandthe 
Third World; Gann and Duignan, Burden of Empire; and Ola Olsson,"On the Democratic Legacy 
of Colonialism"; Midgley and Piachaud, Colonialism and Welfare; and Amone and Muura, "British 
Colonialism and the Creation of Acholi Ethnic Identity." 

1 8. Hechter, Alien Rule. 

1 9. Hopkins, Future of the Imperial Past, 1 9. 

20 Abernethy, Dynamics of Global Dominance, 272-3, 264. 

21 Walker, Power and Prowess. 

22 A. S. Burns, Colonial Civil Servant, 318. 

23 Lumumba, Congo, My Country, 12, 13. 

24. Gilley, "Chinua Achebe on the Positive Legacies." 

25. Ernst and Pati, India's Princely States; Freud, "Organizing Autarky"; Stilwell, "Constructing Colonial 
Power"; and Ypi, "What's Wrong with Colonialism." 

26 Williams, "Postcolonial Flaneur and Other Fellow-Travellers." 

27. Deckha, "Pain as Culture." 

28. Luthi, Falk, and Purtschert, "Colonialism without Colonies." 

29. Englund,"Anti Anti-Colonialism," 243. 

30. Gibney, Age of Apology; and Bentley, Empires of Remorse. 



31 . Quoted in Cohen, "The State in Africa" 1 . 

32. Galli and Jones, Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economics, and Society, 43. 

33. Riley, "Timing and Pace of Health Transitions." 

34. Cann, Counterinsurgency in Africa, 24. 

35. Wolfers/'West African Leader Seeks Talks with Portugal." 

36. Forrest, Guinea-Bissau, 50. 

37. Galli and Jones, Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economics, and Society, 98; and Lopes, Guinea-Bissau, 1 54. 

38. Forrest, Guinea-Bissau, 97. 

39. Mota, Guine Portuguesa, 61 . 

40. Bigman, History and Hunger in West Africa; and Okafor, "Paige and the Economic Development." 

41. Gacitua-Mario et al., "Institutions, Social Networks, and Conflicts," 24. 

42. Mendy, "Amilcar Cabral and the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau"; and Rabaka, Resistance and 

43. Igreja/'Frelimo's Political Ruling." 

44. Levy and Young, Colonialism and Its Legacies ; Mayblin, Asylum after Empire-, and Miles, Scars of 

45. Quoted in Gilley, "Challenge of the Creative Third World." 

46. World Bank, Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa, 5. 

47. Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock, Building State Capability, 20. 

48. Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire. 

49. Burton and Jennings, "Introduction: The Emperor's New Clothes?, "3. 

50. Achebe, There Was a Country, 43. 

51. Msiska, "Imagined Nations and Imaginary Nigeria,"41 3. 

52. Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government; and Barnes, Africa in Eclipse. 

53. Liebhold, "Businesses Brace for Return of Customs." 

54. Schofer and Hironaka, "Effects of World Society." 

55. Honke, "Multinationals and Security Governance in the Community." 

56. Bain, "Love of Order and Abstract Nouns," 1 55, 1 57. 

57. Chandler, "The Uncritical Critique of 'Liberal Peace.'" 

58. Chesterman, You, the People, 1 2. 

59. Sebe, "Post-Colonialism to Cosmopolitan Nation-Building?" 

60. Ignatieff, "Nation-Building Lite." 

61 . Whalan, How Peace Operations Work. 

62. Cunliffe, "State-Building: Power without Responsibility," 52. 

63. Chesterman, You, the People, 239, 1 44. 

64. Groner Krogstad, "Local Ownership as Dependence Management," 1 1 5. 

65. Andersen, "Outsiders inside the State." 

66. Houreld, "World Turns out to Hail Woman Who Carries Hopes of a Continent." 

67. Darwin, "Exit and Colonial Administrations," 29. 

68. Hammond, Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910. 

69. Wu,"A Re-Valuation of the Management of Dutch Taiwan." 

70. Kaplan, "In Defense of Empire." 

71 . Hayward-Jones, Australia's Costly Investment in Solomon Islands, 1 7. 

72. Barbara, "Antipodean Statebuilding." 

73. Lake and Fariss, "Why International Trusteeship Fails"; and Murray and Hehir, "Intervention in 
the Emerging Multipolar System." 

74. Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes, 199-203. 

75. Hechter, "Alien Rule and Its Discontents." 

76. Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire. 

77. Lemay-Hebert, "Critical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding." 

78. Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions, ch. 1 . 

79. Roberts, "Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities"; andTully, France on the Mekong. 

80. Matanock, "Governance Delegation Agreements. 

81. Lemay-Hebert, "Statebuilding without Nation-Building?" 

14 @ B. GILLEY 

82. Van Reybrouck, Congo, 470. 

83. Romer/'Why the World Needs Charter Cities." 

84. Freiman, "Cosmopolitanism within Borders"; and Sagar,"Are Charter Cities Legitimate?" 


Abernethy, D. B. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980. New Flaven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2000. 

Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation." American Economic Review 95, no. 5 (2000): 1369-1401. 

Achebe, C. There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra. New York: Penguin Press, 2012. 

Amone, C., and O. Muura. "British Colonialism and the Creation of Acholi Ethnic Identity in Uganda, 
1894 to 1962 !' The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42, no. 2 (2014): 239-257. doi:10. 
1 080/03086534.201 3.851 844. 

Andersen, L. "Outsiders Inside the State. Post-Conflict Liberia Between Trusteeship and Partnership." 

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, no. 2 (2010): 129-1 52. doi:1 0.1 080/1 7502970903533660. 
Andreski, I. Old Wives' Tales: Life-Stories from Ibibioland. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1 970. 

Andrews, M., L. Pritchett, and M.Woolcock. Building State Capability. Isted. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 201 7. doi:1 0.1 093/acprof:oso/97801 98747482.001 .0001 . 

Bain, W."For Love of Order and Abstract Nouns: International Administration and the Discourse of Ability." 

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 2 (2009): 143-161 . doi:1 0.1 080/1 7502970902829937. 
Barbara, J. "Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and 
Australian Intervention in the South Pacific." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 2 (2008): 
1 23-1 49. doi:1 0.1 080/1 7502970801 988040. 

Barnes, L. Africa in Eclipse. London: Gollancz, 1971. 

Bentley, T. Empires of Remorse: Narrative, Postcolonialism and Apologies for Colonial Atrocity. New York: 
Routledge, 2016. 

Biber, B. Intertribal War in Pre-Colonial Namibia. Geneve: Institut universitaire de hautes etudes 
internationales, 1989. 

Bigman, L. History and Hunger in West Africa: Food Production and Entitlement in Guinea-Bissau and Cape 
Verde. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1 993. 

Branch, D."The Enemy within: Loyalists and the War against the Mau Mau in Kenya !' Journal of African 
History 48, no. 2 (2007): 291-315. 

Burns, A. S. Colonial Civil Servant. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949. 

Burns, E. British Imperialism in West Africa. London: Labour Research Department, 1 927. 

Burton, A., and M. Jennings. "Introduction: The Emperor's New Clothes? Continuities in Governance 
in Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial East Africa." International Journal of African Historical Studies 
40, no. 1 (2007): 1-25. 

Cann, J. P. Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1 974. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1997. 

Chandler, D."The Uncritical Critique of 'Liberal Peace'!' Review of International Studies 36, no. SI (2010): 
1 37-1 55. doi:1 0.1 01 7/S026021 051 0000823. 

Chatterjee Miller, M. Wronged by Empire. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. doi:1 0.1 1 1 26/ 
stanford/9780804786522.001 .0001 . 

Chesterman, S. You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building. 

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. doi:1 0.1 093/01 99263485.001 .0001 . 

Cohen, R."The State in Africa." Review of African Political Economy 3, no. 5 (1976): 1-3. 

Collier, P. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. 1 st ed. New York: Flarper, 2009. 
Cunliffe, P. "State-Building: Power without Responsibility." In State-Building: Theory and Practice, edited 
by A. Hehir and N. Robinson, 50-69. New York: Routledge, 2007. 

Daniels, A."Mau Mau Revisited." New Criterion June (2005): 21-26. 

Darwin, J. "Exit and Colonial Administrations." In Exit Strategies and State Building, edited by R. Caplan, 
22-36. New York: Oxford University Press, 201 2. 



Davis, L. E., and R. A. Huttenback. Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Economics of British Imperialism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 

Deckha, M."Pain as Culture: A Postcolonial Feminist Approach to S/M and Women's Agency." Sexualities 
1 4, no. 2 (201 1 ): 1 29-150. doi:1 0.1 1 77/1 36346071 1 399032. 

Elkins, C. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya. 1 st ed. New York: Flenry Holt 
and Co., 2005. 

Englund, H."Anti Anti-Colonialism: Vernacular Press and Emergent Possibilities in Colonial Zambia." 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 57 , no. 1 (201 5): 221 -247. doi:1 0.1 01 7/S001 041 751 4000656. 

Ernst, W. : and B. Pati. India's Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism. London: Routledge, 2007. 

Fieldhouse, D. K. The West and the Third World: Trade, Colonialism, Dependence, and Development. Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 

Forrest, J. Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict, and Renewal in a West African Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1992. 

Freiman, C. "Cosmopolitanism within Borders: On Behalf of Charter Cities." Journal of Applied Philosophy 
30, no. 1 (201 3): 40-52. doi:1 0.1 1 1 1/japp.201 3.30.issue-1 . 

Freud, B. "Organizing Autarky: Governor General Decoux's Development of a Substitution Economy 
in Indochina as a Means of Promoting Colonial Legitimacy." SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in 
Southeast." Asia 29, no. 1 (2014): 96-131. 

Gacitua-Mario, E., S. Aasland, H. Nordang, and Q. Wodon. "Institutions, Social Networks, and Conflicts 
in Guinea-Bissau: Results from a 2005 Survey." In Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau, 
edited by B.-S. Barry, 23-42. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2007. 

Galli, R., and J. Jones. Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economics, and Society. London: F. Pinter, 1 987. 

Gann, L. H., and P. Duignan. Burden of Empire; an Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the 
Sahara. Hoover Institution Publications. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967. 

Gibney, M. The Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. 

Gilley, B."The Challenge of the Creative Third World i' Third World Quarterly 36, no. 8 (2015): 1 405-1420. 
doi:1 0.1 080/01 436597.201 5.1 044962. 

Gilley, B."Chinua Achebe on the Positive Legacies of Colonialism." African Affairs 115, no. 461 (2016): 
646-663. doi:10.1093/afraf/adw030. 

Groner Krogstad, E. "Local Ownership as Dependence Management: Inviting the Coloniser Back." Journal 
of Intervention and Statebuilding 8, nos 2-3 (2014): 105-125. doi:10.1080/17502977.2014.901030. 

Hammond, R. J. Portugal and Africa, 1815-1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1966. 

Hayward-Jones, J. Australia's Costly Investment in Solomon Islands: The Lessons ofRamsi. Canberra: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 2014. 

Hechter, M. "Alien Rule and Its Discontents." American Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009): 289-310. 
doi:1 0.1 177/0002764209338794. 

Hechter, M. Alien Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 201 3. doi:1 0.1 01 7/CB09781 1 07337084. 

Herbst, J. I. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2000. 

Honke, J. "Multinationals and Security Governance in the Community: Participation, Discipline and 
Indirect Rule." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6, no. 1 (2012): 57-73. doi:1 0.1 080/1 75029 

Hopkins, A. G. The Future of the Imperial Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 

Houreld, K. "World Turns out to Hail Woman Who Carries Hopes of a Continent." The Times 29 (2006). 

Ignatieff, M. "Nation-Building Lite." New York Times Magazine 151, no. 52193 (2002): 26. 

Igreja, V."Frelimo's Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Postcolonial Mozambique." Journal 
of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (201 0): 781-799. doi:1 0.1 080/03057070.201 0.527636. 

Juan, A. D., and J. H. Pierskalla."The Comparative Politics of Colonialism and Its Legacies: An Introduction." 
Politics & Society 45, no. 2 (201 7): 1 59-1 72. doi:1 0.1 1 77/0032329217704434. 

Kaplan, R. "In Defense of Empire." The Atlantic (2014). 

Lake, D. A., and C. J. Fariss. "Why International Trusteeship Fails: The Politics of External Authority in 
Areas of Limited Statehood." Governance 27, no. 4 (2014): 569-587. doi:1 0.1 1 1 1/gove.201 4.27. issue-4. 

16 @ B. GILLEY 

Lange, M., J. Mahoney, and M. vom Hau. "Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis 
of Spanish and British Colonies." American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 5 (2006): 1412-1462. 
doi:l 0.1 086/49951 0. 

Lefebvre, C. "We Have Tailored Africa: French Colonialism and the 'Artificiality' of Africa's Borders 
in the Interwar Period !' Journal of Historical Geography 37, no. 2 (2011): 191-202. doi:1 0.1 01 6/j. 
jhg.201 0.1 1.004. 

Lemay-Hebert, N. "Statebuilding without Nation-Building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits 
of the Institutionalist Approach." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 1 (2009): 21-45. 
doi:1 0.1 080/1 75029708026081 59. 

Lemay-Hebert, N. "Critical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding." Civil Wars 15, no. 2 (2013): 242-252. 
doi:1 0.1 080/1 3698249.201 3.81 7856. 

Levy, J.T., and I. M. Young. Colonialism and Its Legacies. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011. 

Liebhold, D. "Businesses Brace for Return of Customs." Asian Business 33, no. 4 (1997): 12. 

Lopes, C. Guinea-Bissau: From Liberation Struggle to Independent Statehood. London: Zed Books, 1 987. 

Lumumba, P. Congo, My Country. New York: Praeger, 1962. 

Luthi, Barbara, Francesca Falk, and Patricia Purtschert. "Colonialism without Colonies: Examining Blank 
Spaces in Colonial Studies." National Identities 18, no. 1 (2016): 1-9. doi:10.1080/14608944.2016.1 

Matanock, A. "Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for Limited 
Statehood." Governance 27, no. 4 (2014): 589-612. doi:1 0.1 1 1 1/gove.201 4.27. issue-4. 

Mayblin, L. Asylum after Empire: Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking. New York: Roman & 
Littlefield International, 201 7. 

Mendy, P. K."Amilcar Cabral and the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau: Context, Challenges and Lessons for 
Effective African Leadership."Afr/can Identities 4, no. 1 (2006): 7-21 . 

Midgley, J., and D. Piachaud. Colonialism and Welfare: Social Policy and the British Imperial Legacy. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 201 1. doi:1 0.4337/9781 849808491 . 

Miers, S., and M. A. Klein. Slavery and Colonial Rule in Africa. Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999. 

Miles, W. F. S. Scars of Partition: Postcolonial Legacies in French and British Borderlands. Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2014. 

Misevich, P., and K. Mann. The Rise and Demise of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Atlantic World. 
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2016. 

Mota, A.T. d. Guine Portuguesa. 2 vols. Lisboa: Agenda Geral do Ultramar, 1954. 

Msiska, M.-H. "Imagined Nations and Imaginary Nigeria: Chinua Achebe's Quest for a Country." Journal 
of Genocide Research 1 6 , no. 2-3 (201 4): 401-41 9. doi:1 0.1 080/1 4623528.201 4.93671 9. 

Murray, R. W., and A. Hehir. "Intervention in the Emerging Multipolar System: Why R2P Will Miss the 
Unipolar Moment." Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6, no. 4 (2012): 387-406. doi:10.1080/ 

Okafor, F. O. E."The Paige and the Economic Development of Guinea-Bissau: Ideology and Reality." The 
Developing Economies 26, no. 2 (1988): 125-140. doi:10.1 1 1 1 /j.1 746-1 049.1 988.tb001 26.x. 

Olsson, Ola. "On the Democratic Legacy of Colonialism." Journal of Comparative Economics 37, no. 4 
(2009): 534-551 . doi:1 0.1 01 6/j.jce.2009.08.004. 

Plamenatz, J. On Alien Rule and Self-Government. London: Longmans, 1 960. 

Rabaka, R. Resistance and Decolonization, Reinventing Critical Theory . Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
International, 2016. 

Ribi Forclaz, A. Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880- 1 940. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. doi:1 0.1 093/acprof:oso/97801 98733034.001 .0001 . 

Richmond, O. P., and J. Franks. Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 

Riley, J. "The Timing and Pace of Health Transitions around the World." Population and Development 
Review 3t, no. 4 (2005): 741-764. doi:1 0.1 1 1 1/padr.2005.31. issue-4. 

Roberts, D."Hybrid Polities and Indigenous Pluralities: Advanced Lessons in Statebuilding from Cambodia." 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2, no. 1 (2008): 63-86. doi:1 0.1 080/1 7502970701 592298. 

Romer, P."Why the World Needs Charter Cities." 2009. 



Sagar, R. "Are Charter Cities Legitimate?" Journal of Political Philosophy 24, no. 4 (2016): 509-529. 
doi:1 0.1 1 1 1/jopp.2016.24.issue-4. 

Schofer, E., and A. Hironaka. "The Effects of World Society on Environmental Protection Outcomes." 

Social Forces 84, no. 1 (2005): 25-47. doi:1 0.1 353/sof.2005.01 27. 

Sebe, B."From Post-Colonialism to Cosmopolitan Nation-Building? British and French Imperial Fleroes 
in Twenty-First-Century Africa." The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42, no. 5 (2014): 
936-968. doi:1 0.1 080/03086534.201 4.959720. 

Stanley,T."Flistory is Never Black and White." History Today 62, no. 12 (2012): 44. 

Stilwell, S. "Constructing Colonial Power: Tradition, Legitimacy and Government in Kano, 1903-63." 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, no. 2 (2011): 195-225. doi:1 0.1 080/030865 

Tully, J. A. France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia, 1863-1953. Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 2002. 

Van Reybrouck, D. Congo: The Epic History of a People. New York: Ecco, 2014. 

Walker, J. H. Power and Prowess: The Origins of Brooke Kingship in Sarawak. Flonolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2002. 

Whalan, J. How Peace Operations Work: Power, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014. 

Williams, A. "The Postcolonial Flaneur and Other Fellow-Travellers: Conceits for a Narrative of 
Redemption." Third World Quarterly 18, no. 5 (1997): 821-842. doi:1 0.1 080/01 43659971 461 4. 
Wolfers, M."West African Leader Seeks Talks with Portugal." The Times, 26 October 1971: 7. 

World Bank. Partnership for Capacity Building in Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank, Office of the Vice 
President, Africa Region, 1996. 

Wu, T.-M. "A Re-Valuation of the Management of Dutch Taiwan." Taiwan Economic Review 44, no. 3 
(2016): 379-412. 

Young, C. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

Young, C. "The Heritage of Colonialism." In Africa in World Politics: Constructing Political and Economic 
Order, edited by J. W. Harbeson and D. S. Rothchild, 9-26. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016. 

Ypi, L. E. A. "What's Wrong with Colonialism." Philosophy & Public Affairs 41, no. 2 (2013): 158-191. 
doi:1 0.1 1 1 1/papa.201 3.41 .issue-2.